

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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RMR

ACTION: Anembassy, PARIS TOPOL 631 PRIORITY  
INFO: Anembassy, ANKARA (by pouch)  
Anembassy, ATHENS  
Anembassy, BONN  
Anembassy, BRUSSELS  
Anembassy, COPENHAGEN  
Anembassy, LISBON  
Anembassy, LONDON 2187  
Anembassy, LUXEMBOURG (by pouch)  
Anembassy, MOSCOW  
Anembassy, OSLO  
Anembassy, OTTAWA 477  
Anembassy, REYKJAVIK (by pouch)  
Anembassy, ROME  
Anembassy, STOCKHOLM  
Anembassy, THE HAGUE

Deliver: Taylor & Associates, October 18

Ref: Depairtel 626

POLTO 451. POLAD Agenda. Item III.

Responses of NATO govts. to bilateral US approaches indicate that, while there will be sympathy US proposal and considerable positive support, it may be difficult obtain unequivocal POLAD position in favor outright rejection any Soviet overflight or landing requests for aircraft destined for Cuba. Key countries from practical viewpoint are UK and Canada through which flights must necessarily

UK and Canada presumably

more likely take effective action if other NATO govts express positive

TRC:AV:MHStyles:ec 10/17/62

Telephone transmission and

EUR:RPM:Irwin, M. Tobin, Jno

Checkmarks:  
S - Mr. Stoffel  
RPM - Mr. Spielman  
SOV - Mr. Bowden (sub)  
BNA - Mr. Hubbard

BNA - Mr. Bergman

JKM - Mr. Mallard (substante)

TRC - Mr. Bolster

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support US proposal.

Accordingly US rep should endeavor call forth as much support for US proposal as possible with aim of obtaining POLAD agreement no further refel or agreement that ~~QUOTE~~ member countries will take appropriate steps to assure Soviets not able overfly or stop their territory on flights destined Cuba. ~~QUOTE~~. If agreement to either possible, ZERO should report views expressed with its recommendations re further action.

If reps raise question of effect of denial Soviet requests on bilateral civil air transport relations with USSR, Department believes most cogent reply that contained refel. We consider retaliation argument largely smoke screen without to our knowledge basis in actual past experience. It clearly evident present bilateral air transport relations with USSR based on full reciprocity. granting overflight rights to Soviets for Cuban flights, as in case UK (see London's 227 to Paris), has not yet resulted in reciprocity, e.g., permission for British aircraft to fly USSR to third countries.

END.

RUSK

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**TRANSCRIBED COPY FOLLOWS**

ACTION	Amembassy, PARIS	TOPOL	PRIORITY
INFO:	Amembassy, ANKARA		(by pouch)
	Amembassy, ATHENS	"	"
	Amembassy, BONN	"	"
	Amembassy, BRUSSELS	"	"
	Amembassy, COPENHAGEN	"	"
	Amembassy, LISBON	"	"
	Amembassy, LONDON		2187
	Amembassy, LUXEMBOURG		(by pouch)
	Amembassy, MOSCOW	"	"
	Amembassy, OSLO	"	"
	Amembassy, OTTAWA		477
	Amembassy, REYKJAVIK		(by pouch)
	Amembassy, ROME	"	"
	Amembassy, STOCKHOLM	"	"
	Amembassy, THE HAGUE	"	"

Deliver: Farley 8 A.M. October 18.

Ref: Depcirtel 626.

POLTO 451. POLAD Agenda. Item III

Responses of NATO govts to bilateral US approaches indicate that, while there will be sympathy US proposal and considerable positive support, it may be difficult obtain unequivocal POLAD position in favor outright rejections any Soviet overflight or landing requests for aircraft destined Cuba. Key countries from practical viewpoint are UK and Canada through which flights so far performed.

[Excised] ] UK and Canada

presumably more likely take effective action if other NATO govts express positive

support US approved.

Accordingly US rep should endeavor call forth as much support for US proposal as possible with aim of obtaining POLAD agreement as put for the reftel or agreement that QUOTE member countries will take [illegible] hope to assure Soviets not able overfly or stop their territory on flights destined Cuba UNQUOTE. If agreement to neither is possible, USRO should report views expressed with its recommendations re further actions.

If reps raise question of effect of denial Soviet requests on bilateral civil air transport relations with USSR. Department believes most cogent reply that to our knowledge basis in actual past experience. It clearly evident present bilateral air transport relations with USSR based on full reciprocity granting overflight rights to Soviets for Cuban flights, as in case UK (see London's 227 to Paris), has not rpt [illeg] resulted in reciprocity, e.g., permission for British aircraft overfly USSR to third countries.

END.